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1. Introduction 
Spending on productive infrastructure is seen as an important determinant of long term 
economic growth (see Romp and de Haan, 2005, and Bom and Ligthart, 2008, for 
recent surveys). Several authors have documented a downward trend in public 
investment during the last three decades (Välilä et al., 2005) and warned about its 
possible detrimental effects on the economy (see, e.g. Sturm et al., 1999). This debate 
has been important within the European Union, given the drawn-out fiscal 
consolidations in the past four decades and the associated downtrend in public 
investment. In many instances, it has been much easier to achieve the required fiscal 
consolidation by cutting investment than by reducing current spending and raising taxes 
(see, e.g., Mehrotra and Välilä, 2006).  
A not well-realized fact is that productive infrastructure investment is mostly 
provided by sub-national governments. According to Estache and Sinha (1995) most 
infrastructure services where benefits are mostly local –as, e.g. road construction and 
maintenance, urban transit, water supply, and waste management– are completely 
decentralized in many countries and decentralization is proceeding rapidly in many 
others. Big infrastructures, as airports and ports, are also locally managed and funded in 
many countries (see, e.g. Bel and Fageda, 2009). The central government retains the 
responsibility over utility infrastructures, as telecommunications and power, but even in 
this case technological improvements are facilitating the transfer of responsibilities to 
sub-national governments1.  
This is certainly the case in Europe, as Figure A.1 in the Annex clearly illustrates. 
The share of sub-national investment in economic infrastructures is 70% in EU-10 
countries, around 60% in Cohesion countries, and more than 40% in the New Member 
                                                 
1 Although in these cases the most relevant policy responsibilities are regulatory, most 
investment being carried out by private actors (see Alegre et al., 2008, and Montolio and Trillas, 
2011).  
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States. The sub-national share of investment in Public Goods is of a similar size, while 
the sub-national share of investment in Hospitals and Schools and Redistribution is even 
higher. These numbers mean that what sub-national governments do is crucial for 
sustaining the level of investment and avoiding a depreciation of the capital stock. Of 
course, a considerable proportion of this investment is funded through capital grants, 
some of them funded by the national government and others coming from the EU.  
Both scholars and international organizations recommend a decentralized 
approach to the provision of infrastructure (World Bank, 2001; Brosio and Ahmad, 
2009). Better matching of preferences and needs (Oates, 1972; Faguet, 2004) and 
increased accountability (see, e.g. Seabright, 1996) are the arguments used to support 
this policy. Decentralization is typically recommended if the above benefits compensate 
for any inefficiency generated by spillovers and/or the limitation of economies of scale. 
In cases where spillovers and/or scale economies are important, sub-national provision 
coupled with national or even supra-national funding is recommended (see, e.g. Hulten 
and Schwab, 1997). Yet there are just a few papers that have analyzed the effectiveness 
and efficiency of these arrangements, as most of them focus on the ability of 
infrastructure investment to promote growth and convergence (García-Milà and 
McGuire, 1996; Puga, 1999).  
There are just some papers in the literature analyzing how sub-national 
governments set their investment. For example, Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) 
document that investment by US local governments depend on the current level of 
revenues, resulting in a pro-cyclical behaviour. Sub-national fiscal adjustment also 
seems to fall disproportionally over investment in Spain, according to Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2011). These authors document a pattern of sub-national fiscal 
adjustment that has some differences to the one found for the cases of the US and 
Germany (see, Buettner and Wildasin, 2006, and Buettner, 2009, respectively). These 
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authors suggest that the answer to these differences must lie in the institutional 
framework of local governments in each country.  
An under-researched – but theoretically plausible – determinant of the 
composition of public investment at the sub-national level is the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. While the impact of expenditure decentralization is straight-forward, 
the impact of revenue decentralization on sub-national spending decisions is not well 
understood. Revenue decentralization has many dimensions (Stegarescu, 2005). In this 
paper we focus on two of them: (i) the percentage of revenues coming from taxes 
generated sub-nationally, and (ii) the use of transfers that are earmarked to specific 
purposes (here to infrastructure investment). Related to the first dimension, in countries 
where sub-national governments are mostly funded with intergovernmental transfers, 
the sub-national budget constraint is typically isolated from sub-national spending 
decisions. Although more spending on productive infrastructure could foster the growth 
of tax bases and tax revenues, sub-national revenues are generally insensitive to 
economic growth. Thus the incentives to pursue growth-enhancing policies (invest in 
productive infrastructure) are much lower than in countries where sub-national 
governments are funded through tax revenues. Surprisingly, there are no empirical 
papers studying whether the shift in incentives caused by tax decentralization is 
quantitatively meaningful. Previous work has shown that revenue decentralization has a 
significant positive impact on governments’ aggregate investment in infrastructure 
(Kappeler and Välilä, 2008), although it has not been examined what level of 
government accounts for that increase.  
However, the second dimension – the use of earmarked capital transfers– could 
potentially counteract the incentive effects provided by fiscal decentralization. The 
reason is that the use of earmarked transfers might considerably reduce the autonomy 
that sub-central governments have on decisions regarding amount and composition of 
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investments. Selecting investment projects based on complex hierarchical systems 
might in practice delink the decision to undertake a project in a given region from its 
growth effects - and thus tax revenues - in that particular region.  We are also not aware 
of any empirical contribution analyzing the effect on public investment of this 
interaction between fiscal decentralization and the funding through capital transfers.  
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and the composition of public 
spending has been assessed empirically from a number of angles. Closest to our analysis 
is Kappeler and Välilä (2008), who consider the impact of different decentralization 
measures on four types of investment by the general government (i.e., aggregating the 
central and sub-national levels of government) in a panel of EU member states. They 
conclude that decentralization increases aggregate (general government) investment in 
infrastructure, schools and hospitals, and in public goods such as defence, environment 
and order and safety. They find no significant impact on redistributive capital outlays 
(social housing, recreation, social protection). 
A number of empirical studies consider whether decentralization is associated 
with a higher degree of responsiveness to local preferences. Jin et al. (2005) find that in 
China an increase in tax revenue retention rate boosts regional governments’ pro-
business policies, leading e.g. to higher growth of rural enterprise employment and 
private non-agricultural employment. Esteller and Solé (2005) find that decentralization 
(task assignment) in Spain (at NUTS-3 level) increased the sensitivity of public invest-
ment in infrastructure and schools to regional output, users and costs. Finally, Faguet 
(2005) suggests that decentralization in Bolivia and Colombia made public investment 
more responsive to local needs. In Bolivia investment in education and sanitation rose 
where illiteracy was highest and sanitary connections poorest, respectively.  
Studies focussing on German municipalities and counties have found support for 
fiscal competition increasing spending on public inputs. Hauptmeier et al. (2009), 
5
considering German local governments (municipalities in the state of Baden-
Württemberg), conclude that they use both corporate tax (Gewerbesteuer) rates and 
public inputs (spending on municipal road network) to compete for mobile capital. If 
neighbours cut tax rates, local governments cut, too, and boost spending on public 
inputs. Borck et al. (2005) find that German counties (Landkreise) use spending to 
attract mobile capital and labour. This holds at the aggregate level of spending and 
individually for spending on general administration, schools, R&D, housing and 
business development. There is no significant relationship for spending on public safety, 
health and recreation. 
In sum, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that decentralization may 
cater better to local preferences and boost expenditure on public inputs, including 
through competition for capital and labour between sub-national units of government. 
The earlier empirical literature has left gaps to be filled. There is a paucity of systematic 
cross-country evidence, as the focus in the studies mentioned above has been mainly on 
individual countries. Also, very few studies have contrasted investment in public inputs 
(such as infrastructure) with other types of public spending (investment), thus not being 
able to detect any systematic differences between different types of sub-national 
spending (investment). As a result, it has so far not been possible to test the hypotheses 
derived. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the 
provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. Does revenue decentralization, 
measured as the budget share of locally-generated tax revenues, provide incentives to 
spend (relatively) more on growth-enhancing infrastructure policies? Does the use of 
capital grants countervail or enhance the incentives provided by tax decentralization? 
We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on 
the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the 
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period 1990-2009. We interpret the results in light of the predictions of the theory of 
fiscal federalism. The findings are compared to those obtained when using sub-national 
investment in redistribution, for which the theory predictions are different. Our results 
show that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue 
decentralization and that this does not occur with other types of investment. We also 
find that the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked 
grants to fund infrastructure investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews a number of theoretical 
approaches linking fiscal decentralization with the composition of government 
spending, seeking to articulate testable hypotheses for the subsequent empirical 
analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and data, and Section 4 reports and 
interprets the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
This section presents a brief overview of different theories of fiscal federalism with a 
focus on the impact of tax decentralization and earmarked transfers on the level and 
composition of government spending.  
Fiscal interest theory. This line of reasoning (see, e.g. Weingast, 2009) suggests that tax 
decentralization, by explicitly connecting the effects of spending policies with the 
revenue budget, provides incentives to focus on growth-enhancing policies and to 
reduce rent-seeking and waste in government. In this second generation fiscal 
federalism theory, sub-national governments are considered to be pursuing their own 
interests rather than being benevolent (see also Oates, 2005). Financing through formula 
grants does not provide the adequate incentives to foster growth because the effect of a 
region’s economic policies is translated to the growth of the national revenue pool, of 
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which at most the region will be able to capture a tiny proportion. Careaga and 
Weingast (2003) call this effect the ‘fiscal law of 1/n’, obviously referring to the share 
of national revenues captured by one region when there are n regions of same size. In 
contrast with this, entirely funding spending through taxes generated in the region 
means that 100% of the revenues generated as a result of a particular policy are kept in 
the revenue budget of the sub-national government. 
The prediction of this theory is clear. Increasing tax decentralization would 
increase the % of revenues retained by the region (the so-called ‘marginal retention 
rate’) and this will increase the marginal benefit of productive spending vis-a-vis other 
possible uses of spending. These authors focus on the effects of rents and wasteful 
spending (see Weingast, 2009, and Careaga and Weingast, 2003), meaning that tax 
decentralization would increase the efficiency in government spending and, under some 
conditions, even reduce the size of the overall budget. Note, however, that the stronger 
incentives to spend productively will also reduce other spending even if it can not be 
considered wasteful. But even in this case the effect would be efficiency-enhancing, 
since previous to tax decentralization the sub-national government was not considering 
the correct relative prices of the different types of spending. Note also that the argument 
does not depend on the mobility of tax bases, since the effects of productive spending 
on the tax base could simply occur through its effect on the growth of the national tax 
base. As pointed out by Hindriks et al. (2008), the fiscal interest theory does not make 
any explicit treatment of mobility. 
Given the policy shift towards more productive spending and more growth-
oriented government policies, the Fiscal interest theory also suggest that growth should 
be stronger in tax-decentralized places. More concretely, the main hypothesis that has 
been put to test is the one that links the marginal retention rate (% of taxes retained by 
sub-national governments / taxes generated sub-nationally) and the GDP growth rate. 
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For example, Jin et al. (2005) and Zhuravskaya (2005) provide evidence of such a 
positive link for China and Russia, respectively, and Weingast (2009) discusses 
additional cases of study. To our knowledge, the link between fiscal incentives and sub-
national infrastructure policies has not been analyzed.  
Fiscal competition. The literature on fiscal competition between sub-national units 
of government has generated a number of reasonably clear-cut insights about the 
composition of their spending. It is important to recognize that competition in this 
context is considered active in the sense that sub-national governments use tax or 
expenditure policies to pursue certain goals (such as to attract firms in order to boost 
their employment and income), with policy decisions by one unit affecting others 
(Ferreira et al., 2005).  
In the simplest case the competition between sub-national governments (call 
them “regions” for simplicity) only concerns tax rates: each region seeks to attract 
productive firms by lowering tax rates on mobile capital. As firms move to regions with 
the lowest tax rates, a “race to bottom” ensues, resulting in sub-optimally low tax rates 
and, hence, sub-optimally low levels of tax revenues as well as spending by regions on 
both public consumption goods and public investment. This conclusion has been 
associated with Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).2  
Extending the competition between regions to cover not only tax policies but also 
expenditure policies, Keen and Marchand (1997) conclude that the outcome is a relative 
overprovision of productivity-enhancing public inputs such as infrastructure (which 
attract mobile capital) and an under-provision of public consumption goods. The 
analysis of Keen and Marchand has been extended in Borck (2005). He introduces 
mobile skilled labour and immobile unskilled labour as extensions of the tax base, 
                                                 
2 However, Sinn (2003) has argued that the analysis is methodologically flawed and that the 
conclusion only holds for public consumption goods. 
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together with three public goods: a public input, a public consumption good benefiting 
skilled labour (e.g. “opera houses”) and unskilled labour (e.g. “social housing”), 
respectively. The mobility of capital and skilled labour in this set-up will lead to an 
overprovision of the public input as well as the public good benefiting skilled labour, 
and to an under-provision of the public good benefiting unskilled labour. More recently, 
Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) obtain the same results regarding the relative over-
provision of infrastructure in a more general framework3. 
Also in these models, tax decentralization (understood as a sub-national 
participation on the revenues generated in the jurisdiction) is the force behind the bias in 
favour of productive spending. In fact, some authors have suggested the use of 
(Pigouvian) grants to alleviate this bias (see, e.g. Ferreira et al., 2005, and Hindriks et 
al., 2008). In practice, these grants can take two forms: (i) matching grants earmarked to 
investment spending, and (ii) general equalization transfers, which can be used to fund 
any kind of spending4. In the margin, if a sub-national government has to share with the 
rest of the country a % of the extra revenues generated by a particular growth enhancing 
infrastructure project, the marginal benefits of this project will be reduced. An increase 
in the % of equalization is akin to a reduction in the percentage of taxes in the revenue 
budget of sub-national governments, both policies having thus the same effects. 
Capital grants. In practice, public investment at sub-national level is funded in a 
non-deniable proportion by capital grants from national or even supra-national (the EU) 
governments. These grants are earmarked for capital spending and have co-funding 
                                                 
3 We have to admit that the over-investment result if not universal. Recently Hindriks et al. 
(2008) have developed a dynamic model where sub-national governments invest in 
infrastructure in the first period in order to alleviate tax competition in the second one. This 
particular timing of the game generates under-investment. See also Bucovetsky (2005) for 
alternative analysis of the over vs under-provision of productive goods. 
4 See also Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) for analysis of the incentives effects of equalization 
transfers on tax-setting in a situation with tax competition. These authors do not consider the 
effect on the spending mix. 
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requirements at the project level (i.e. the sub-national government has to provide a 
given per cent of the funding of each project). Which is the impact of these grants on the 
level of investment? It is tempting to answer that these grants are like the matching 
grants proposed above. However, this is probably not the case in practice. Since they are 
not open-ended, and there is a high degree of fungibility between investment projects, 
they work more as a block grant. If optimal investment in the presence of transfers is 
higher than the amount of the grant multiplied by 1 + m, where m is the matching rate 
(resources added by the sub-national government over grants), then the effect of the 
grant will be like the one of any other increase in unconditional resources. If optimal 
investment is lower than this threshold then the effect of the transfer would be to raise 
investment until this threshold is reached. Moreover, it could be that the effective 
matching rate is much lower than the one established in the rules of the grants, due to an 
improper application of the rules (e.g. using grants from other layers of government to 
justify the additional level of sub-national investment required by the rules) or to 
corruption (e.g. using the same certificates of investment done to collect grant payments 
from different layers of government or collecting grants for public works not really 
done). It is interesting to note that empirical studies estimating the ability of this type of 
capital grants over investment find that these grants are fungible, with each euro of 
grants stimulating investment by less than one euro (see, e.g. Lago-Peñas, 2006). 
The effect of earmarked capital transfers on the effect of tax decentralization on 
investment is less straightforward. In theory, if earmarked capital transfers are like 
lump-sum transfers (as we argued above), more tax decentralization would still improve 
the incentives in the margin to shift the budget towards economic investment. However, 
there are several reasons that suggest that this might not be the case in practice. First, 
earmarked capital transfers often imply  an increase in the capacity of the central 
government to intervene in the selection of investment projects, thus constraining the 
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capacity of sub-central governments of deciding on the amount and type of investment 
pursued. Second, earmarked transfers imply that sub-central governments have co-
funding requirements. This might exhaust its ability to channel current account savings 
to marginal investment projects, even if these projects are profitable in terms of 
additional revenues. Third, as a the prospects of the region depend more on the 
decisions taken at central level (amount of transfers received and conditions attached), 
the resources of the regional government might shift towards rent-seeking activities 
(lobbying the central government) and away from studying which is the best way to 
improve the local economy (see Weingast, 2009). 
Summing up, the predictions of the Fiscal competition theory (at least of most of 
the models) are the same than those of the Fiscal interest literature:  more tax 
decentralization (and/or less equalization) will generate more investment on productive 
infrastructure, relative to other types of investment. Of course, the normative 
implications are different. In the Fiscal competition literature, the situation before a 
possible reduction in tax decentralization is one of over-provision of infrastructure and, 
thus, reducing decentralization would bring the level of infrastructure provision closer 
to the social optimum. In the Fiscal interest literature the situation is reversed: with 
decentralization the optimal level of infrastructure would be provided, so centralization 
would move the level of provision towards an under-provision. In any case, both first 
and second generation theories predict more infrastructure investment as tax 
decentralization increases. We seek to test whether that is, indeed, true, and also how 
grants affect that relationship.  
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3. Econometric Approach 
3.1. Model 
Our aim is to identify the impact of decentralisation on different types of regional 
(state+local) investment. For doing so, we compare 2 types of regional investment: (1) 
Economic affairs, which mainly consists of transport investment (see Alegre et al. 
(2008)) and (2) Redistribution (social protection, recreation, culture and religion and 
housing). Mapping the hypotheses outlined in Section 2, we specify an econometric 
model to measure the link between regional investment and decentralisation.  
 
 (1) ittiititititititit
k
it
k
it uSDGDPGTGTII ++++++×+++= −−−−−− γγββββββλ 161514132111           
 
where uit ~ i.i.d (0, σ2), with subscript i referring to observations in the cross-sectional 
dimension (individual countries) and t to observations in the time dimension. The 
dependent variable kitI  represents gross sub-national capital formation of type k (k =1, 
2). Gross capital formation includes changes in inventories, which may create some 
undesired variation for our analysis; however, the breakdown between gross fixed 
capital formation and changes in inventories is not available. kitI  is expressed relative to 
trend GDP in order to avoid the estimated coefficients just pick up the effect of cyclical  
co-movements in investment and tax revenues.  
Fiscal decentralisation is measured by the share of tax revenue attributed to sub-
national levels of government (local and state governments), which is denoted 1−itT . 
The regional tax share is lagged by one period to reflect the fact that investment 
decisions are most often taken one year before the investment takes place, and 
investment decisions are most likely based on knowledge about the revenue situation at 
that time.  
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We also control for investment grants from the central government to sub-national 
levels of government ( itG ); they are also measured relative to trend GDP and 
contemporaneous with investment as they finance investment the same year it is 
undertaken. Grants include “other capital transfers and investment grants”5 received by 
local and state governments aggregated over all types of investment. Therefore, it is its 
composition or its conditionality that drives the effect of grants in equation (1). For 
instance, a positive impact of investment grants on infrastructure investment may imply 
that either a large amount of modestly effective grants or a small share of highly 
effective grants is provided conditional on investment. The model also contains the 
interaction term between 1−itT  and itG . This term is added to the equation to test 
whether the impact of decentralisation on different investment types depends on the 
amount of investment grants received.  
To control for the macro-economic environment, we include real GDP, which is 
expressed relative to trend population (in millions of Euro) and lagged by one period. 
The short- and longer term fiscal environment is captured by the budget surplus of the 
sub-national governments (Sit-1) and debt of the general government (Dit-1). Data for 
debt are only available as aggregate over all tiers of government. Both variables are 
measured in relation to trend GDP and lagged by one period. A reason for using the 
one-period lags of the real GDP and fiscal variables is to address any bias arising from 
the possible joint determination of these explanatory variables and the dependent one.6 
 
                                                 
5 According to ESA-95, other capital transfers “cover transfers other than investment grants and 
capital taxes, which do not themselves redistribute income but redistribute savings or wealth 
among the different sectors or sub-sectors of the economy or the rest of the world. “Investment 
grants” consist of capital transfers in cash or in kind made by governments or by the rest of the 
world to other resident or non-resident institutional units to finance all or part of the costs of 
fixed assets. 
6 Note that the significance of our results do not change if the dependent variables - grant, debt 
and lend - are expressed relative to nominal GDP instead of nominal trend GDP. Results are 
available upon request. 
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3.2 Description of the Sample 
Our data are from Eurostat and OECD and cover 20 EU-countries (NACE 1) over the 
period 1990-2009. Most of the variables that we use are reported by sub-sector of 
government. Based on ESA-95 we define regional expenditure as the sum of local and 
state governments. General government, defined in ESA-95 refers to the sum over local, 
state and central government as well as social funds. Since not all countries have back-
dated all relevant series to 1990, the panel is unbalanced.  
Table A1 in the Annex shows the summary statistics for the variables used. Table 
A2 in the Annex reports the results of the Im, Pesaran, and Chin (Im et al., 1997) and 
Fisher (Maddala and Wu, 1997) unit root panel tests. Overall, the tests demonstrate that 
all variables are stationary. Table A3 in the Annex shows the correlation matrix for 
variables included in our model. Correlation among explanatory variables is mostly 
negligible.7 
3.3. Estimation Method 
To account for the high auto-correlation in the dependent variable (see Table A4 in the 
Annex), we apply a dynamic panel data approach.  
Our estimation method is the Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC) 
estimator, which has recently been discussed in the literature for estimating dynamic 
panel data models where the T and N dimensions are similar to ours. Monte-Carlo 
studies show that LSDV has a relatively small variance compared to the IV and GMM 
dynamic panel estimators. Kiviet (1995) discusses how to correct the bias of LSDV. 
Monte-Carlo evidence shows that corrected LSDV often outperforms the IV and GMM 
estimators in terms of bias and root mean squared error (RMSE) and suggests to use 
                                                 
7 A more informative indicator of multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). VIFs 
larger than 10 are found for regtax, grant, gdp and debt. This indicates that multicollinearity 
might be an issue for our estimations, adversely affecting the precision of the parameter 
estimates. Having said this, it would not affect the validity of our presented statistical inference. 
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LSDVC for data with a small N dimension (see e.g. Judson and Owen (1999)). Bruno 
(2005) extends the bias approximations derived in Bun and Kiviet (2003) to 
accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. Starting 
values for the bias correction with this methodology can be determined by either an 
Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator, the standard one-step Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator 
with no intercept, or the system GMM estimator that was implemented in STATA by 
David Roodman. 
As the implementation of investment plans may take place over more than a year, one 
may argue that the share of tax revenue - even if lagged by one period - and government 
grants in Equation (1) may be correlated with the error term. This endogeneity would 
question the choice of LSDVC as preferred estimation method, which rests on the 
assumption of strict exogeneity of all regressors. Soto (2010) suggests that both fixed 
effects and GMM estimation results should be provided for small panels with a large 
number of T and a small number of N. His Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the 
one-step system GMM estimator has a relatively low bias in such cases, however, in his 
simulation N=35 is the small sample setup. Restricting the set of instruments, as 
suggested by Roodman (2009)), is the recommended approach, but also introduces a 
considerable degree of arbitrariness as parameter estimates and diagnostic test results 
may depend considerably on the choice of the set of instruments. The reliability of 
system GMM results for N=20 is doubtful according to most simulation studies on the 
properties of system GMM and according to Hayakawa (2007) the bias of system GMM 
is inversely related to N. Therefore we present the fixed effects model and system 
GMM results as robustness checks. 
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  4. Results 
Below we present the results estimated with LSDVC for the empirical model 
represented by Equation (1) with the lagged dependent variable included to account for 
the dynamic character of the dependent variable. 
4.1. Basic  Results  
Tables 1 and 2 present the results for the two dependent investment variables, Economic 
Affairs and Redistribution. It also includes results for several simplified equations to 
assure that the selection of controls does not drive the results. The tables show that with 
first-order autocorrelation coefficients between 0.3 and 0.7, the dependent variables are 
highly auto-correlated and persistent. 
[Tables 1 and 2] 
Decentralisation (variable 1−itT ) has a significantly positive effect on 
infrastructure investment (Table 1), but not on investment in redistribution (Table 2). 
Expressed in % changes, the parameter estimates for decentralisation imply that an 
increase in the sub-national tax share by one percentage point leads to an increase in 
investment in infrastructure of about 0.01 percentage points as share of GDP, or 1.7 
percent evaluated at the sample mean.  
Based on these results, it is possible to determine the long-run effect of 
decentralisation on investment in infrastructure. Indeed, Rodríguez-Pose (2010) shows 
that in a dynamic panel data regression the long-run effect of an independent variable 
can be derived by dividing its observed regression coefficient by the “speed of 
adjustment parameter”, which equals the parameter of the lagged dependent variable. In 
our case this suggests a long-term effect of decentralisation on infrastructure investment 
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of 0.009/(1-0.716)=0.032 (standard error: 0.013), or 6.1 percent for an increase in the 
sub-national tax share by one percentage point (evaluated at the sample mean). 
The variable itG  (capital transfers) has a significantly positive impact on 
economic affairs, transport infrastructure and redistribution. As to the interaction term 
between tax decentralisation and grants ( itit GT ×−1 ), it is significant only for economic 
affairs with a negative sign. This suggests that the impact of decentralisation on 
infrastructure investment is inversely related to the amount of investment grants 
received by regional governments. This result is not surprising if one sees investment 
grants as instrument of the centre to influence regional investment decisions. Investment 
grants taken alone put a monetary incentive for regions to invest. At the same time our 
results suggest that decentralisation taken alone also puts incentives for regions to invest 
(in infrastructure). Accordingly, by undermining the positive effect of decentralisation 
through the backdoor by providing conditional transfers weakens the positive link 
between decentralisation and regional investment in infrastructure.  
With a significant interaction term, the overall effect of decentralisation has to be 
evaluated at a reasonable level of investment grants. Evaluated at the sample mean of 
investment grants, the effect of decentralisation on investment decreases from 0.009 to 
0.006 but remains significant at the 1% level.  
GDP and general government debt are insignificant in all of these specifications. 
At the same time, as the results in Column (4) demonstrate, their inclusion does not 
drive our main results.  
4.2. Robustness Checks and Extensions of the Model 
To place our results in a broader perspective and check their robustness, this section 
discusses several extension of the basic model and presents results for regional transport 
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investment only, investment in economic affairs by the central government and total 
regional investment.  
Data are available not only for economic affairs as aggregate investment, but also 
for regional transport investment as its main component. However, this information is 
only available for a subset of countries. Column (1) in Table 3 shows that as for 
regional investment in economic affairs, total decentralisation and investment grants 
have a significantly positive effect on regional transport investment; the interaction term 
is significantly negative.  The effect size of decentralisation is about 60 percent higher 
than for economic affairs in total (Column (2), Table (3)). Note, however, that these 
results should be taken with a pinch of salt given the relatively small number of 
observations (132). 
Decentralised spending responsibilities and more decision power for regions is not 
the same thing and may have different implications for regional investment. Additional 
spending responsibilities for regions result - by definition - in more spending. This in 
turn is likely to translate into higher regional investment. In contrast, more decision 
power of regions provides them with a much wider spectrum of actions. Regions may 
increase their spending overall, they may adjust the composition of their spending but 
leave the overall level unchanged or they may lower the level of total spending.8 To 
assure that the tax-decentralisation variable captures decentralisation that goes beyond 
the transfer of pure spending power, we also control for spending decentralisation. One 
might expect that (lagged) spending decentralisation and lagged regional investment are 
correlated. However, due to the different transformations applied (public investment 
relative to trend GDP versus regional expenditure as a share), the correlation between 
these two variables is low (ρ=0.11). Column (2) in Table 3 shows that, when adding 
                                                 
8 Given the definition of our principal measure of decentralisation (regional tax revenue/general 
government tax revenue) it also increased if regions were granted the right to levy taxes, but 
would not do so, for instance if it were in a tax competition with neighbouring regions.  
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spending decentralisation to the model, the parameter of revenue decentralisation is 
smaller but remains significant for infrastructure investment; itG continues to have a 
positive impact and the interaction term has a significantly negative impact on 
investment in economic affairs.  
One might also argue that the degree of equalisation - the share of unconditional 
grants received by regional governments in their total revenues - affects 
decentralisation. But the results in Column (3) of Table (3) show that including 
equalisation, defined as the share of unconditional transfers over total transfers, has no 
impact on regional investment in economic affairs and does not alter the significance of 
our variables of interest. 
To further corroborate our results on the link between regional investment and 
decentralisation, Column (4) of Table (5) displays results for central government 
investment in economic affairs. In contrast to the previous results, decentralisation has 
no impact on central government investment in infrastructure. 
In separate regressions not reported in the tables, we also controlled for population 
and population growth, respectively. Thereby we take into account that investment may 
increase simply as a response to a growing population. Population is significant for 
investment in redistribution and population growth is significant for investment in 
infrastructure. The significance of 1−itT , itG  and the interaction term, however, remains 
unchanged. 
Changes in economic activities, which are not directly linked to decentralisation, 
may affect the regional tax share as well. For instance, a boom in the housing market 
would increase the local tax share if the local level relied more on this type of revenue. 
As it is difficult to control for such events, they may cause an endogeneity problem. The 
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joint inclusion of population growth and GDP per capita should, however, absorb most 
of these effects and thus alleviate the problem. 
Regional governments may not simply receive investment grants for certain kinds 
of investment but rather apply for these grants. If this is the case, a potential omitted 
demand variable problem may dilute our results. To assure that the difficulties 
surrounding the itG  variable do not affect our interpretation of the results for the 
decentralisation variable, we also present estimation results for simplified models, 
which exclude itG  and/or the interaction term (Columns 2-3 in Tables 1 and 2). The   
parameter of tax decentralisation declines but remains significance at the 10% level.   
Moreover, to address potential endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, 
capital transfers, tax decentralisation (as discussed in Section 3.3) and, potentially, GDP 
we also show fixed effects and system GMM results as suggested by Soto (2010). When 
applying fixed effects OLS and using the cluster option, the significance of the variables 
of interest (decentralisation, investment grants and their interaction) remains unchanged. 
Only for the fixed effects model with cluster command, the decentralisation variable 
turns significant for regional investment in redistribution. As to system GMM results, 
Table A5 shows that we are able to reproduce our main results by using system GMM 
with a limited number of instruments. Note however, that debt is significantly positive 
for economic affairs and significantly negative for recreation. AR(1) and AR(2) and 
Sargan tests perform well . Overall, the Fixed Effects and system GMM results suggest 
that our findings are robust against the choice of estimation procedure.   
 
5. Conclusion 
As shown in the empirical analysis above, decentralisation in terms of tax shares 
increases public investment in infrastructure; public investment in redistribution is not 
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significantly affected by decentralisation. Table (3) also includes results for total 
regional investment in Column (5). The positive link between total regional investment 
and decentralisation suggests that decentralisation on regional infrastructure investment 
is additional and does not go hand in hand with a considerable reduction in other types 
of regional investment, such as health, education or safety. This result confirms the 
finding by Välilä and Kappeler (2008) that decentralisation has a positive impact on 
overall infrastructure investment.  
As to investment grants, they have a positive impact on both types of regional 
investment. The negative interaction between investment grants and decentralisation for 
regional infrastructure investment suggest that the impact of tax decentralisation on 
regional infrastructure investment declines with increasing receipts of investment grants 
by regional governments. This result is intuitive. As the significance of the tax-
decentralisation parameter suggests, higher regional decision autonomy leads to more 
investment in infrastructure. Attempts to undermine the power of regions through the 
backdoor - e.g. by introducing conditional transfers - will at least partly offset the 
positive effect of decentralisation. This is not in contrast with the finding that 
investment grants per se, which are often provided contingent on investment, increase 
regional investment. 
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Table 1:  
Decentralization and Investment in Economic Affairs.  
Corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged investment 
  
0.716*** 
(0.054) 
0.739*** 
(0.056) 
0.783*** 
(0.054) 
0.724*** 
(0.054) 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 
  
0.009*** 
(0.311) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.00203) 
0.009*** 
(0.00296) 
Capital grants 
  
0.168*** 
(0.045) 
0.094*** 
(0.021) --.-- 
0.161*** 
(0.039) 
Capital grants × Tax decentralization(t-1) 
  
-0.400* 
(0.207) --.-- --.-- 
-0.397** 
(0.184) 
GDP(t-1) 
  
0.010 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.023) 
0.012 
(0.024) --.-- 
Surplus(t-1) 
  
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
0.0032 
(0.013) --.-- 
Debt(t-1) 
  
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) --.-- 
Obs 281 281 281 281 
No of countries 20 20 20 20 
Notes: (1) ***: 1% Significance Level, **: 5% Significance Level,*: 10% Significance Level. (2) 
System GMM estimator used to initialize the bias correction of xtlsdvc. (3) Year effects included.  
 
 
 
Table 2:  
Decentralization and Investment in Redistribution. 
Corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged investment 
  
0.331*** 
(0.0398) 
0.342*** 
(0.041) 
0.415*** 
(0.046) 
0.356*** 
(0.041) 
Tax decentralization (t-1) 
  
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Capital grants 
  
0.201*** 
(0.0513) 
0.136*** 
(0.025) --.-- 
0.217*** 
(0.047) 
Capital grants × Tax decentralization(t-1) 
  
-0.354 
(0.232) --.-- --.-- 
-0.408* 
(0.221) 
GDP(t-1) 
  
0.006 
(0.026) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
--.-- 
 
Surplus(t-1) 
  
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.017) --.-- 
Debt(t-1) 
  
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
--.-- 
 
Obs 281 281 281 281 
No of countries 20 20 20 20 
   Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 3:  
Decentralization and Investment. Additional results.  
Corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Transport 
Economic 
Affairs 
Economic 
Affairs 
Cent. 
Gov.          
Ec. 
Affairs 
Total 
Investment 
Lagged investment 
  
0.718*** 
(0.0800) 
0.708*** 
(0.0537) 
0.701*** 
(0.0549) 
0.707*** 
(0.0556) 
0.545 
(0.043) 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 
  
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
Capital grants 
  
0.228*** 
(0.0628) 
0.180*** 
(0.0439) 
0.163*** 
(0.046) 
0.219 
(0.0984) 
0.446 
(0.102) 
Capital grants × Tax decentralization(t-1) 
  
-0.844*** 
(0.311) 
-0.418** 
(0.204) 
-0.368* 
(0.216) 
-0.466 
(0.453) 
-0.595 
(0.469) 
Spending decentralization(t-1) --.-- 0.006*** (0.002) --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Equalization(t-1) --.-- --.-- -0.002 (0.005) --.-- --.-- 
GDP(t-1) 
  
-0.012 
(0.043) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.053) 
0.067 
(0.053) 
Surplus(t-1) 
  
-0.002 
(0.0268) 
-0.009 
(0.0123) 
-0.012 
(0.0126) 
-0.080*** 
(0.0273) 
-0.029 
(0.02937) 
Debt(t-1) 
  
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Obs 132 281 281 281 281 
No of countries 11 20 20 20 20 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Annex: 
Figure A.1: 
Shares of central and other levels of government in  
aggregate government investment (averages, 2000-05) 
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Source: Alegre et al. (2008) 
Notes: (1) EU-10 comprises all old EU-15 member states excluding LU and the Cohesion countries 
(“Coh.” in the graph, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain). NMS denotes new member states. 
(2) Classification of government investment follows Alegre et al. (2008). 
 
Table A1:  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Affairs investment 317 0.00525 0.00294 0.00021 0.01415 
Transport Infrastructure investment 150 0.00489 0.00322 0.00010 0.01368 
Redistribution Investment 317 0.00445 0.00294 -0.01786 0.01695 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 315 0.18636 0.13518 0.01152 0.52152 
Capital grants 351 0.00799 0.00745 0.00047 0.06169 
Capital grants × Tax decentralization(t-1) 313 0.00133 0.00165 0.00004 0.01123 
GDP(t-1) 337 0.02064 0.01083 0.00286 0.06123 
Surplus(t-1) 336 -0.00157 0.00550 -0.03319 0.02511 
Debt(t-1) 344 0.57800 0.28178 0.04251 1.34174 
Spending decentralization(t-1) 336 0.30133 0.13218 0.04325 0.65899 
Equalization(t-1) 362 0.48944 0.16534 0.17278 0.83361 
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Table A2:  
Panel unit root tests. 
 Fisher tests 
 Statistic P-value 
Economic Affairs investment 75.45 0.0006 
Redistribution Investment  200.01 0 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 66.54 0.0053 
Capital grants 143.91 0 
GDP(t-1) 54.33 0.0648 
Surplus(t-1) 106.17 0 
Debt(t-1) 89.05 0 
Decentralisation expenditures(t-1) 59.09 0.0263 
Equalisation(t-1) 111.91 0 
 
 
Table A3:  
Correlation among explanatory variables 
  Tax dec(t-1) Capital grants GDP(t-1) Surplus(t-1) Debt(t-1) 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 1 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Capital grants -0.161 1 --.-- --.-- --.-- 
GDP(t-1) -0.035 -0.024 1 --.-- --.-- 
Surplus(t-1) -0.167 -0.098 0.044 1 --.-- 
Debt(t-1) -0.058 -0.041 -0.115 -0.109 1 
 
 
 
Table A4:  
Autocorrelation of Dependent Variables 
 AC Q-Stat Prob 
Economic Affairs investment 0.884 249.98 0 
Redistribution Investment  0.739 174.72 0 
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Table A.5:  
Decentralization and Investment in Redistribution 
Results for Fixed Effects OLS with and without cluster option and System GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Economic Affairs Redistribution 
  
FE 
(cluster) FE System GMM 
FE 
(cluster) FE 
System 
GMM 
Lagged investment 
--.-- 0.555*** 0.689*** --.-- 0.279*** 0.576*** 
(0.05) (0.091)  (0.036) (0.110) 
Tax decentralization(t-1) 
0.017** 0.010*** 0.012** 0.006 0.004 0.009 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Capital grants 
0.247*** 0.165*** 0.266*** 0.259** 0.208*** 0.233** 
(0.083)* (0.034) (0.092) (0.098) (0.037) (0.092) 
Capital grants × Tax 
decentralization(t-1) 
-0.723 -0.42** -0.985* -0.506 -0.370** -0.814* 
(0.442) (0.161) (0.406) (0.39) (0.176) (0.479) 
GDP(t-1) 
0.023 0.011 -0.024 -0.020 0.004 -0.021 
(0.062) (0.020) (0.014) (0.061) (0.022) (0.017) 
Surplus(t-1) 
-0.035** -0.013 0.006 -0.030** -0.011 0.009 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Debt(t-1) 
-0.002** 0.001 0.000* -0.003** -0.002** -0.001* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Obs 284 284 281 284 284 281 
R_2 0.02 0.73  0.32 0.67  
No of countries 11 20 20 20 20 20 
No of instruments    60   52 
Sargan    0.589   0.896 
AR(1)    0.000   0.000 
AR(2)     0.199     0.813 
Notes: (1) ***: 1% Significance Level, **: 5% Significance Level,*: 10% Significance Level. P-
values reported for AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan tests. The instrument matrix has been reduced with the 
collapse command (Roodman 2009). System GMM specification accounts for potential endogeneity 
of the lagged dependent variable, tax decentralisation, capital grants and GDP using different lag 
structures as instruments (laglimits specified variable and regression specific between 3 and 20). 
Variable specific exogeneity and Sargan tests (not reported) are insignificant. Further details are 
available upon request. 
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